8 November 2022
Special issue of the Internet Policy Review (No article processing charge)
Abstract submission deadline: January 15, 2023
Full paper submission deadline: June 1, 2023
Editors: Thomas Poell (University of Amsterdam), David Nieborg (University of Toronto), José van Dijck (Utrecht University), Robyn Caplan (Data & Society / Duke University).
Amidst popular conversations about antitrust regulation and trillion-dollar valuations, the notion of “platform power” has found firm footing in the scholarly lexicon. Media and communication scholars have tried to unpack platform power by theorising forms of corporate control that include “algorithmic power” (Bucher, 2018), “curatorial power” (Prey, 2020) and “metric power” (Beer, 2017). These studies are complemented by research that seeks to theorise and investigate the infrastructural, organisational and economic dimensions of corporate control (Caplan & boyd, 2018; DeNardis & Hackl, 2015; Plantin et al., 2018; Srnicek, 2017). In turn, business scholars have become more cognizant and vocal about the unprecedented clustering of capital (Parker et al., 2021; Bietti, 2022), while legal scholars have developed vocabulary and considered legal instruments to more effectively address platform power (Cohen, 2019; Khan, 2017).
Many of these interventions tend to play out within the confines of self-defined disciplinary silos, conferences and journals. Dialogues across the fields of media and communications, geography, economics and strategic management are still quite rare. This special issue aims to enable such dialogues, drawing insights from these different fields to systematically examine how platform power takes shape, where and how it evolves. In this effort, we understand platforms as “data infrastructures that facilitate, aggregate, monetize and govern interactions between end-users and content and service providers” (Poell et al., 2021, p. 5), and propose to approach power in platform markets and infrastructures as relational, but also highly uneven. In this sense, we assume that power is not held by a specific actor, but that it emerges from and shapes unequal relations between actors (Emirbayer, 1997). Contributors to the special issue are, of course, free to propose alternative understandings of platforms and other approaches to power.
For this special issue we invite contributions that locate and theorise platform power through specific case studies on particular types of platforms and modes of platform power. First, we aim to locate platform power through detailed case studies by asking: where do relations of power take shape on a specific platform and how are these relations organised? We hypothesise that platform power is exerted, codified, and operationalised around particular platform services (Van Dijck et al., 2019). Leading platform companies typically own and operate a range of such services, which are tied together in a unified corporate structure (Cohen, 2019; Newman, 2020). We propose that these individual services have taken on infrastructural properties as they have morphed into ubiquitous, networked sociotechnical systems. Therefore, rather than analysing how a platform company constitutes an all-powerful monolithic entity, we call for greater specificity by locating, analysing and theorising the set(s) of services that together constitute platform power. Ideally, contributors to the special issue will explicitly interrogate how dominant platforms shape local and regional power relations around the globe.
Second, in this inquiry we also focus on the evolution of platforms. Infrastructural services, such as Google Maps, Apple’s App Store, or Facebook for Business each set standards and provide gateways for complementors to access other institutional actors, data and end-users. Yet, these services are constantly adapted to local regulatory frameworks, to retain end-users and complementors, and to respond to competitors in platform ecosystems (Nieborg & Helmond, 2018). In turn, such changes force complementors to adapt their own operations to continue offering their products and services through the platform. It is in these moments of change, when relations of dependence are reshuffled, that platform power becomes most visible. Moreover, the continuous evolution of platforms also points to the extreme diversity of services, business models, economic, social, cultural and political contexts, which are all contained by the notion of a platform. Hence, contributors are invited to both reflect on the evolving nature of the notion of platforms and the diverse realities that hide within this concept.
Third, while the special issue’s primary aim is to locate and theorise platform power, we also welcome contributors to discuss efforts by institutional actors – states, corporations, NGOs – to negotiate, countervail, or simply negate platform power. Such a discussion may include the analysis of concrete actions taken by these actors and/or a survey of potential public or private platform alternatives.
Potential case studies may include, but are not limited to:
Beer, D. (2016). Metric power. Palgrave Macmillan.
Bietti, E. (2022). Self-regulating platforms and antitrust justice. Texas Law Review, 101.
Bucher, T. (2018). If...then: Algorithmic power and politics. Oxford University Press.
Caplan, R., & boyd, d. (2018). Isomorphism through algorithms: Institutional dependencies in the case of Facebook. Big Data & Society, 5(1), 1-12. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951718757253
Cohen, J. (2019). Between truth and power: The legal constructions of informational capitalism. Oxford University Press.
DeNardis, L., & Hackl, A. M. (2015). Internet governance by social media platforms. Telecommunications Policy, 39(9), 761-770.
Khan, L. (2017). Amazon's antitrust paradox. Yale Law Journal, 126(3), 710-805.
Newman, J. M. (2020). Antitrust in attention markets: Definition, power, harm. University of Miami Legal Studies, 3745839. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3745839
Nieborg, D. B., & Helmond, A. (2019). The political economy of Facebook’s platformization in the mobile ecosystem: Facebook Messenger as a platform instance. Media, Culture & Society, 41(2), 196-218. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443718818384
Parker, G., Petropoulos, G., & Van Alstyne, M. (2021). Platform mergers and antitrust. Industrial and Corporate Change, 30(5), 1307-1336. https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtab048
Plantin, J.-C., Lagoze, C., Edwards, P. N., & Sandvig, C. (2018). Infrastructure studies meet platform studies in the age of Google and Facebook. New Media & Society, 20(1), 293-310. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444816661553
Poell, T., Nieborg, D.B., & Duffy, B. E. (2021). Platforms and cultural production. Polity.
Prey, R. (2020). Locating power in platformization: Music streaming playlists and curatorial power, Social Media + Society 6(2), 1-11. https://doi.org/10.1177/205630512093329
Srnicek, N. (2017). Platform capitalism. Polity.
Van Dijck, J., Nieborg, D. B., & Poell, T. (2019). Reframing platform power, Internet Policy Review, 8(2). https://doi.org/10.14763/2019.2.1414