Caring is normally intertwined with the mechanisms of individuation. A prior understanding of who or what in principle particularly needs to be cared for in this world somehow presupposes the fulfilment of caring. This implicit clarity binds an ontological moment with an ethical one: the existence of ‘fragility’ (somebody or something to be cared for) in the world mingles together with the alleviation of possible harm and suffering for those in need of care. The exercise of care implies that the world is not homogeneous in terms of the needs of the beings that inhabit it, and that this heterogeneity imposes obligations on some beings to care for others. That said, the vocabulary of beings and actions is already at hand, so to speak. Each ontological position has a specific function, and this function is supported by a repertoire of corresponding practices: each participant engages into caring relationship in a fairly specific role or within particular template. How to conceptualise care when this 'folk' ontology is suspended?